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McCain-style campaign finance regulation is
the new campaign reality. But what exactly will
this reformist utopia look like? Assessing the
“reformed” campaign of the future against the
stated desires and expectations of the principal
campaign finance regulators and their media
supporters, this paper predicts the most impor-
tant changes in political campaigning, changes
that will be experienced for the first time during
the 2003–04 electoral cycle. Those changes
include the following:
• The ban on soft money fundraising by the
national parties will make our elections sig-
nificantly less competitive. 
• The federal soft money ban will reduce
voter turnout by approximately 2 percent 
• As a result of the soft money ban, both the
parties and their candidates will lose influ-
ence over their own campaigns. 
• The prescribed channeling of third-party
advertising through political action com-
mittees (PACs), paid for only in hard money
donations, will increase the number of
PACs and the proliferation of PAC-run
microcampaigns. 
• The severe restrictions on independent
advertising will inadvertently produce both
longer and more negative campaigns.
Overall, the allegedly reformed campaign of
the future will be less competitive, less controlled
by candidates and their parties, and more influ-
enced by the mainstream media and will involve
fewer voters than the typical campaign of today.
Most Americans support real campaign finance
reform, but clearly this is not the future promised
to them by the self-described reformers.
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Introduction
The addition of President George W. Bush’s
signature to the campaign finance bill passed by
Congress amounted to an anti-democratic triple
play for advocates of heightened regulation of
political activity.1 The new legislation, known as
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, will make
future campaigns less competitive, strengthen
the mainstream media’s grip on political dis-
course, and run roughshod over the First
Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech.
In practice, this hot political bat will turn into an
outright victory for incumbency protection.
McCain-style campaign finance regulation
is the new campaign reality. The ban on soft
money (large and largely unregulated) dona-
tions to the national parties,2 the increase in
hard money (small, regulated, direct contribu-
tions to candidates), and the severe limitations
placed on independent political advertising col-
lectively constitute the most significant
changes to campaign finance law since the
post-Watergate regulations of 1974.3
But what exactly will this reformist utopia
look like? What will political life be like now that
the BCRA has poked a stake in the heart of the
“nexus of corruption”4 at the federal level? As
described by pro-regulation Sen. Carl M. Levin
(D-Mich.), the political campaign of the future
will be better because “the political landscape . . .
will be filled with more people and less influence,
more contributors and smaller contributions,
more democracy and less elitism.”5 Assessing the
“reformed” campaign of the future against the
stated desires and expectations of the principal
campaign finance regulators and their media
supporters, this paper predicts the most impor-
tant changes in political campaigning, changes
that will be experienced for the first time during
the 2003–04 electoral cycle. 
Principal Changes in
Political Campaigning
Less Competitive Elections
The ban on soft money will have an anti-
competitive impact on future electoral out-
comes. Everyone (except perhaps members of
Congress) favors more competitive elections.
After all, in recent elections, 98 percent of
incumbent members of the House success-
fully sought reelection. Of 435 congressional
districts, only a few dozen experience truly
competitive elections.6 According to pro-reg-
ulation political columnist Albert R. Hunt,
“The appalling lack of competition in
Congressional elections is another void in
the system.”7 In the long term, most analysts
and electoral participants agree that this
state of affairs is clearly incompatible with a
healthy political system. 
Unfortunately, the ban on soft money
fundraising by the national parties will make
our elections significantly more uncompeti-
tive. How so? Both major parties currently
use soft money to increase the competitive-
ness of individual congressional races.
Without those partisan resources pouring
into targeted districts, fewer incumbents will
be threatened by serious challengers, which
will further reduce political competition. 
Current federal law bans the use of corpo-
rate- or union-donated soft money for adver-
tisements that expressly advocate the elec-
tion or defeat of a candidate for federal
office. The new restrictions on independent
advertising will further hamper the efforts of
the average challenger. Overall, independent
advertising campaigns funded by groups rep-
resenting business, labor, or single-issue
interests are disproportionately critical of
incumbents. Generally, those groups adver-
tise their frustrations with the voting record
of particular elected officials, warning their
respective memberships (and other poten-
tially sympathetic segments of the electorate)
about the likelihood of “more of the same,” if
a given incumbent receives another electoral
endorsement. 
Because the cumulative effect of the loss of
soft money and constraints on independent
advertising will be to reduce political competi-
tion, even fewer candidates will step forward to
challenge incumbents in the first place, thereby
further reducing political choice.
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Fewer Voters
Campaign finance regulators decry public
apathy, especially as reflected in low levels of
voter turnout on Election Day. Senate
Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) asks,
“Is it good enough that in every election the
amount of [campaign] money spent goes up
and the number of people voting goes
down?” According to Sen. John McCain (R-
Ariz.), the principal force behind the new
campaign finance law, the new regulations
will “help to restore the public’s faith in gov-
ernment.”8 Campaign finance regulators
assert that the traditionally low levels of voter
turnout in both presidential and midterm
elections9 are attributable, in part, to cam-
paign advertising that is allegedly too nega-
tive in tone and too personal in nature.
Hence the need, it is argued, to ban the soft
money contributions that, for example, pay
for party advertising campaigns that are dis-
proportionately critical of incumbents. 
What is ignored in this debate is the fact
that the parties do much more with their soft
money revenue than simply fund negative
advertising campaigns. The parties also use
soft money to register voters and conduct
get-out-the-vote efforts, especially among
minority voters. The inevitable reduction in
financial transfers from the national to the
state party organizations will handicap voter
identification and mobilization efforts at the
local level.10 The best available research con-
cludes that, because it costs a party organiza-
tion $15–$20 to identify a new voter and then
get that new voter to the polls on Election
Day, the federal soft money ban, which will
decrease party organizational expenditures
by about 20 percent, will reduce voter
turnout by approximately 2 percent.11
Parties and Candidates Lose Influence to
Special Interests
The brazenly unconstitutional restric-
tions on third-party advertising during the
60 days preceding Election Day and the 30
days prior to primary day are intended to
“return control” over campaigns to the can-
didates and their parties. However, as a result
of the soft money ban, both the parties and
their candidates will lose influence over their
own campaigns. In fact, the BCRA arguably
constitutes the unilateral disarmament of
the major parties.
The national parties currently coordinate
their advertising campaigns with their
respective senatorial and congressional can-
didates. Once the implementation of the new
campaign finance regulations occurs after
the 2002 midterm elections, the parties will
have less operational and strategic influence
over the campaigns conducted in specific
states and districts. 
The pro-regulation editorial writers of the
Washington Post naively assume that “lawmak-
ers can wash some $500 million in big-money
contributions out of the federal system: the
cash from corporations, unions and wealthy
individuals that was supposed to be banned
from individual campaigns but that parties
and officeholders have learned to use for the
benefit of specific candidates.”12 That fore-
cast is echoed by Sen. Daschle, who believes
that “we have the first real chance in a gener-
ation to limit the access of special interests in
the political process.”13
On the contrary. Special interest groups, cor-
porations, and labor unions will retain previously
donated soft money funds. At an earlier point of
the campaign, those groups will spend that
money independent of the parties and candi-
dates. In addition, prior soft money contributions
from wealthy individuals will flow to these special
interest campaigns instead of to their current des-
tination—the national parties. For example, the
role of the so-called nonpolitician 527 commit-
tees,14 such as EMILY’s List, will remain unregu-
lated by the BCRA after November 6, 2002.
Therefore, as those political committees will be
able to continue to raise large amounts of soft
money, their influence will expand significantly
vis-à-vis the political parties.15
The Washington Post further predicts that
the soft money ban “should take away some
of the steam that drives the current, ever-
expanding system. Those in business who say
they feel obliged to contribute in order to
protect their interests will have some insula-
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tion; donors who are aiming to curry favor or
buy access will have less incentive to give.”16
That view ignores the fact that the most
important factor driving campaign contribu-
tions and campaign spending upward is a
government that grows ever larger in size and
in scope.  Taxes and regulations on society
have increased the ambit of government at all
levels.  Increasing government activity leads
to more efforts (including campaign contri-
butions and independent campaign spend-
ing) to influence political decisions, a rela-
tionship confirmed by scholarly studies.17
The 527 committees will provide receptive
outlets for large donations that otherwise
would be made to the parties themselves.
Political journalist Dan Balz reminds us
that, “until 1996, proponents of campaign
finance legislation had focused their energies
on eliminating or sharply restricting the role
of political action committees (PACs).”18
Ironically, during the final eight and a half
weeks of the general election campaign of the
future, the prescribed channeling of third-
party advertising through PACs, paid for
only in hard money donations, will increase
the number of PACs and the proliferation of
PAC-run microcampaigns.19 A large number
of such microcampaigns will perform a series
of one-time advertising attacks in specific
races. These hit-and-run operations will all
occur completely outside the control, but not
the purview, of individual campaigns and the
national parties.
Longer, More Negative Campaigns
Media supporters of campaign finance reg-
ulation regularly decry independent advertis-
ing campaigns, referring to the advertisers as
specialists in “sham”20 or “phony”21 issue ads.
Sen. McCain campaigned in favor of new cam-
paign finance regulation in part to rid our
election-time airwaves of such allegedly “mis-
leading issue advertisements,”22 advertise-
ments sponsored by special interests, such as
the National Rifle Association and the Sierra
Club (private groups voluntarily supported by
millions of ordinary Americans). The political
elitism inherent in the anti-independent-
advertising argument ignores scholarship
that, according to political scientists Stephen
Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar, finds: 
Voters . . . are not fools, nor are they
fooled by political advertising.
Although people command few facts
about the candidates, they do hold
strong beliefs about politics in gener-
al. . . . These attitudes temper the
electorate’s receptiveness to political
commercials. . . . Advertising . . .
affects the electorate unevenly and in
ways that leave very little room for
electoral manipulation.23
The severe restrictions on independent
advertising will inadvertently produce both
longer and more negative campaigns.
Neither the incentive to advertise nor the
resources to do so will be lessened by the new
regulations. Instead, independent advertisers
will be forced to begin running their ads
sooner, on average, than is currently the
norm. Debate surrounding the efficacy of a
Clintonesque “permanent campaign” will
become redundant, as most independent
advertising will begin several months, even
years, before polling day. 
Both political scientists and political con-
sultants generally consider negative ads one of
the most relatively effective methods of influ-
encing electoral outcomes.24 To date, negative
ads have been especially common among
independent advertising campaigns because
those campaigns generally represent the views
of individuals who are organized and funded
in opposition to a particular candidate, a cur-
rent piece of legislation, or a proposed policy
prescription. Hence, those groups dispropor-
tionately advertise against someone or some-
thing, frequently accentuating the negative in
an incumbent’s record or the current state of
affairs nationwide or in a particular state,
region, or district. A major contributing factor
to the relative success of well-produced nega-
tive ads is that they tend to be more memo-
rable than positive ads. Therefore, those
groups advertising more than two months
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prior to Election Day will view an even more
negative approach as the most effective means
of spending their advertising dollars within
the new regulatory limits. 
The major parties will be forced to
respond in kind. They will devote more of
their slimmed-down advertising campaigns
to matching the independent ads’ negativity.
As a result, the parties will sacrifice a consid-
erable portion of their positive advertising,
which traditionally highlighted their own
candidates’ biographies and platforms, in
order to spend a far greater share of their
advertising budget on negative ads that draw
sharper partisan and personal comparisons
between candidates.
More Powerful Media
The mainstream media, whose support
for campaign finance regulation is nearly
unanimous, stands to benefit from the new
restrictions on political speech. First, the
broadcast media’s political influence will
increase under campaign finance regulation.
During the latter period of a general election
or a primary campaign, when the undecided
swing voters who determine the outcome of
most close elections decide how they will
vote, the editorial influence of newspapers
will be largely uncontested by other nonpar-
tisan actors. Similarly, the image-enhancing
or image-destroying impact of broadcast
media reporting will not be offset, as com-
monly occurs today, by independent voices
whose advertising during the final weeks of a
campaign is frequently critical of media-
dominated conventional wisdom in general
and of careerist politicians in particular. 
Second, the print media will be a financial
beneficiary of campaign finance regulation.
The constraints on independently sponsored
broadcast advertising during the final 60
days of a general election campaign, for
example, will transfer advertising spending
during that period from the media of televi-
sion and radio to newspapers and magazines.
This “back to the future” development in the
history of American political advertising is
analogous to the situation in other Western
nations where government intervention
severely constrains otherwise voluntary, pri-
vate behavior in the political sphere. In the
United Kingdom, for example, a prohibition
on paid broadcast advertising by the parties
and candidates means that the only recourse
for those political actors is paid advertising
in the national newspapers—a relatively inef-
fective tool in the age of the Internet and dig-
ital, satellite, and cable television—and on
roadside billboards, which is as inefficient a
mode of contemporary political communica-
tion as print advertising. So the new political
advertising reality will benefit the bottom
line of such vociferous print media support-
ers of campaign finance regulation as the
New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los
Angeles Times, USA Today, Time, and Newsweek
but will make it less likely that the electorate
will have access to comparable levels of polit-
ical information.
Fundraisers Are More Influential
According to Albert R. Hunt, under the
new campaign finance system “fundraising
will be a slightly smaller political priority.”25
Incumbent politicians are frequently chas-
tised for the disproportionate amount of
time they spend attending fundraising events
and making fundraising phone calls for their
next campaign compared with the amount
of time they spend performing the duties of
the office to which they were elected. The
Washington Post observed that “some office-
holders wearied of the endless pressure to
raise money.”26 Although that comment cor-
rectly assesses the imbalance evident in the
average politician’s day-to-day schedule, it
ignores the fundamental cause of the elec-
torally conscientious politician’s attention to
fundraising. 
For almost 30 years, hard money dona-
tions were capped at a nominal $1,000 a year.
As a result, the average incumbent spent
increasing amounts of time chasing the rela-
tively small contributions permitted by law
to fund campaigns whose costs were not
comparably capped and which frequently
reach into the millions of dollars at the con-
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gressional level and into the tens of millions
of dollars at the senatorial level.27 According
to House Minority Leader Richard A.
Gephardt (D-Mo.), the new legislation will
stop politics from being about “fundraisers
for large TV advertising campaigns.”28 But
the new campaign finance regulations only
raise the cap on individual contributions to
$2,000 a year. An inflation-adjusted increase
would have seen the cap raised to approxi-
mately $3,500.29
Crucially, this deficient remedy for the
average federal candidate’s fundraising
addiction will be offset by the loss of nation-
al party spending in the respective candi-
date’s state or district. This loss of national
party spending will directly result from the
national parties’ loss of soft money. The
national parties’ soft money would have been
spent in races all across the country, especial-
ly targeted to the 45–55 most competitive
congressional and the dozen most competi-
tive senatorial races. The fact that politicians
will spend more time fundraising to make up
for the loss of national soft money also
means that their fundraisers (especially the
so-called bundlers, who put together thick
envelopes of separate checks from a large
number of individual contributors)30 will
gain further influence in the political system.  
President Bush Sets Fundraising and
Campaign Spending Records
Signing the new campaign finance legisla-
tion was clearly in President Bush’s electoral
self-interest. In 2000, Gov. Bush’s primary
campaign was so successful at collecting
hard money donations that Bush could
afford to refuse the matching funds available
to qualifying presidential candidates under
existing campaign finance law. In fact, Bush
raised a record $113 million during the 2000
primary season.31 As the new campaign
finance regulations allow for a maximum
$2,000, rather than $1,000, hard money
donation, it is conceivable that, because Bush
is a popular president seeking reelection with
an unprecedented fundraising base, funds
raised for his reelection campaign will sur-
pass $200 million and, perhaps, reach $250
million.32 Therefore, it is highly likely that
Bush will also forego taxpayer funding of his
2004 primary campaign.33
Because it is unlikely that Bush will face a
serious opponent for the Republican Party’s
presidential nomination, during the spring
and summer months of 2004 his campaign
will be able to devote its mammoth cam-
paign war chest to defending Bush’s record
and excoriating the record and views of his
projected Democratic opponent. By contrast,
the eventual Democratic nominee will be the
survivor of a bruising, costly primary contest.
Consequently, he or she is likely to be left—
after securing his or her party’s de facto nom-
ination in the spring of 2004 and the official
Democratic Party’s nomination at its con-
vention in late summer—without sufficient
funds to effectively combat the Bush cam-
paign’s anticipated record-setting pre–Labor
Day advertising onslaught. 
Of course, during the post–Labor Day gen-
eral election campaign, the Democratic nomi-
nee will be able to avail him- or herself of the
several tens of millions of dollars in taxpayer
funding available to each major party’s presi-
dential candidate. It is likely, however, that
President Bush will waive taxpayer funding (of
both his primary and his general election cam-
paigns) and will privately raise a far greater
amount for his general election campaign.
Therefore, as a direct result of the new cam-
paign finance regulations, the 2004 presiden-
tial campaign may witness the most signifi-
cant financial advantage held by one major
party’s candidate over another’s since William
McKinley, the establishment Republican can-
didate, out-fundraised populist reformer
William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic stan-
dard bearer, in the 1896 presidential election.
That situation will provide considerable his-
torical irony for Sen. McCain. The political
fallout surrounding the alleged influence of
McKinley’s corporate donors led McKinley’s
successor in the White House, President
Theodore Roosevelt—Sen. McCain’s political
hero—to support the effort that made corpo-
rate donations illegal.
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Conclusion
Overall, the allegedly reformed campaign
of the future will be less competitive, less con-
trolled by candidates and their parties, and
more influenced by the mainstream media
and will involve fewer voters than the typical
campaign of today.
It appears, therefore, that campaign
finance regulation’s principal goals will not
be realized. On the contrary, the unintended
consequences of the new constraints on
political speech will serve only to further the
journey of American political campaigning
down a path seemingly anathema to the stat-
ed desires of the leading campaign finance
regulators. Most Americans support real
campaign finance reform, but clearly that is
not the future promised to them by the self-
described reformers.
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